Most existing collusion-resistant fingerprinting techniques are for fingerprinting uncompressed signals. In this paper, we first study the performance of the traditional Gaussian based spread spectrum sequences for fingerprinting compressed signals and show that the system can be easily defeated by averaging or taking the median of a few copies. To overcome the collusion problem for compressed multimedia host signals, we propose a technique called Anti-Collusion Dithering to mimic an uncompressed signal. Results show higher probability of catching a colluder using the proposed scheme compared to using Gaussian based fingerprints.
INTRODUCTION
Digital fingerprinting has emerged as one of the important traitor tracing tools to combat illegal redistribution of copyrighted multimedia content. A fingerprint signal that is unique to a recipient is embedded in every legally distributed copy of the content. When a leaked copy is obtained, the embedded fingerprint is used to identify the source of the leak. Collusion is a powerful and cost-effective attack, whereby a set of users attempt to create a new version of the content that does not contain traces of their fingerprints. Several systematic fingerprint construction techniques have been proposed to resist collusion attacks [1, 2, 3] . Most existing works use Gaussian based spread spectrum sequences for modulation as they have been shown to have good collusion resistance [4] on uncompressed host signals.
However, multimedia content is often stored and transmitted in compressed form to conserve storage space and transmission bandwidth. Thus, a fingerprinting system should account for the fact that the host signal, the fingerprinted signal, and the colluded signal are in compressed form. (1) where D (A) is the maximum allowed squared distortion given the quantization step size A.
The users may perform collusion attacks to remove traces of their fingerprints. Let Sc represent the set of K users contributing to generate the colluded signal which may be compressed for easy storage and transmission. The colluded signal V is quantized with step size Ac so that Vj = mAc. The attackers' choice of Ac is affected by the value of A. Since the fingerprinted signal has already been quantized with step size A, choosing Ac < A would not improve the quality of the attacked signal. When colluders apply such a smaller quantization, not only would it lead to increased bandwidth requirements for the colluded copy, traces of the fingerprint may also remain in the data, which results in a higher probability for at least one of the colluders to be caught. On the other hand, choosing Ac > A would further degrade the perceptual quality of the colluded signal. In this paper, we examine the scenario with Ac = A as a reasonable compromise between the two cases. The colluded version V is thus obtained as V = g({X(k)}kcsC), where g(.) is the collusion function. Collusion attacks have been studied in [4] for Gaussian based independent fingerprints for uncompressed host signals. In this paper, we first extend these attacks to compressed signals by adding quantization and examine their effectiveness against the fingerprinting system. Due to space constraints, here we take averaging, median, and minimum attacks as examples for illustration: Further processing, such as addition of noise and filtering, may be applied to the colluded signal, which we model as additive white Gaussian noise, n, with zero mean and variance 2,as shown in Fig. 1 Fig. 1 . System Model able to the detector in fingerprinting applications, the detector first removes the interference from the host signal S by subtracting it from the attacked signal, Z, and applies preprocessing h(.) [4] to obtain the test signal. The user q whose fingerprint has the maximum correlation with the extracted test signal is declared guilty:
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF GAUSSIAN BASED FINGERPRINTING
In this section, we examine the performance of using Gaussian based independent signals as fingerprints for compressed orw is chosen such that the constraint in Eqn. (1) is satisfied. We test the performance of the system for A = 6, 4, and 1 which correspond to quantization step sizes for the AC,, band in the JPEG table for quality factors 75, 85, and 95, respectively. A quality factor of 75 generally provides a good tradeoff between signal quality and bit rate. Fig. 2 shows the probability of catching one colluder, Pd, versus the number of colluders for three different types of collusion attacks, namely, averaging, median, and minimum.
In each case, the additive noise power is set to be comparable to the fingerprint power, i.e., Watermark-to-Noise Ratio (WNR) = OdB. We observe from the figure that the probability of catching one colluder reduces as A increases for all the attacks considered. Pd 1 for all three attacks with more than 30 colluders. For A 1, the results are similar to those obtained for uncompressed host signals, and the system can resist more than 30 colluders. However, as A increases, the performance drops. We observe that for A = 6, corresponding to a JPEG quality factor of 75, averaging attack is the most effective and the fingerprinting system can resist only 7 colluders with Pd r-1. Also, we notice that the Pd does not degrade gracefully with the number of colluders, and there is an abrupt drop around 10 colluders. A similar trend is observed for A = 4, and the system can only resist up to 15 colluders.
To gain insight into the reduced collusion resistance under compressed host signals, we examine in Fig. 3 the distribution of the colluded fingerprint (without additive noise) for 25 users' collusion obtained from analytic and simulation studies. The analytic p.m.f.'s (shown in solid dots) and the simulation histograms (shown in gray bars) agree with each other very well. Under averaging collusion for A = 6, we see from Fig. 3(a) that most of the colluded fingerprint components are 0, leading to a failure in identifying colluders. However, when A = 1, approximately half of the colluded fingerprint components remain non-zero under averaging collusion which enables us to catch at least one of the colluders with high probability. A similar trend is observed under the minimum attack for A = 6 and A = 1 as shown in Fig. 3(c) and (d), respectively. Comparing the histograms for averaging and minimum attacks under A = 6 indicates that, while averaging collusion removes almost all fingerprint traces, the minimum attack is less-effective and still retains some fingerprint components, justifying the results in Fig. 2 next section, we propose an anti-collusion dithering technique to enhance the performance of the fingerprinting system for compressed host signals.
ANTI-COLLUSION DITHER
The main reason that the traditional Gaussian based fingerprinting fails on compressed host signals is because of the discrete nature of the signals before and after fingerprint embedding. When the quantization step size becomes larger (e.g. A = 6 as discussed in the previous section), we notice that the Gaussian distributed fingerprints are mostly quantized to 0, especially after multi-user collusion as shown in Fig. 3(a) . This does not happen for uncompressed host signals, because the relatively continuous nature of the host signal helps retain the fingerprint information even after the fingerprinted signal goes through compression. Inspired by this observation, we propose to add a random dither sequence to host signal before embedding fingerprints in the uncompressed host signal case.
As an example, we model the p.d.f. of the cian distribution that has been shown to be a DCT coefficients [7] . However, the results c dependent of the host signal distribution. Fi p.d.f. of the host signal before quantization, quantization, fs,. If the quantization step size compared to the variance of the host signal, t host signal can be approximated as a staircas constant probability density within a bin as sh
The staircase function can be obtained by Upon obtaining the attacked signal Z, the detector extracts the fingerprint and declares user q to be guilty if
=1,2,...
We test the fingerprinting system with the proposed ACD using the same settings as before. Fig. 5 shows the histograms of the embedded fingerprint for a single user with and without ACD. We observe that the embedded fingerprint is now more continuous in nature and thus improves the collusion resistance. Fig. 6 compares the probability of catching one colluder Pd, with and without ACD for A = 6 at a WNR of OdB. We observe that the performance of the system has improved significantly. The collusion resistance is now quadrupled and the system with ACD can resist over 30 attackers' collusion compared to only 7 if without ACD.
CONCLUSIONS
I15 3 0uIn this paper, we examine the problem of fingerprinting com- 
